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1. Introduction 
The aims of this chapter are: first to contextualise the imposition of sanctions against non-state actors 
(NSAs) – to explain the trend towards them and their goals and purposes. It considers the notion of 
NSAs (terrorists, rebels …) drawing a line between them and state actors, which is not as 
straightforward as might first appear (shown, for example, by the case of individual politicians or 
governmental employees). The next step is to undertake a legal doctrinal analysis of such measures, 
first in terms of their legal nature (whether they are imposed to punish illegal acts or to tackle threats 
to the peace), and the values they are meant to protect (security, human rights, democracy …). The 
chapter then considers their legal bases (in treaties, collective countermeasures, custom …). The legal 
obligations imposed by them are analysed (whether they bind members, all states, NSAs themselves), 
and their legal effects considered (whether they criminalise, punish directly or indirectly, override 
existing obligations). Any legal limitations upon them are identified (from general principles of 
international law such as non-intervention to specific legal regimes such as international human rights 
law). The chapter also considers issues of implementation, oversight and enforcement of sanctions 
against NSAs; and accountability for misapplied or overly injurious sanctions. The legal analysis is 
based on relevant constitutional, international and regional laws, as well as the practice of the UN, the 
EU, and the US,1 as leading actors in the imposition of this type of measure. The aim is to consider 
the above issues in the light of the particular purposes, form and effects of sanctions against NSAs. 
Several studies of paradigmatic sanctions regimes against NSAs conclude the chapter, and 
conclusions are drawn particularly on the development of a more sophisticated legal framework to 
govern sanctions taken against NSAs. 
 
2. The Trend Towards Sanctions against NSAs 
                                                          
 Professor of Public International Law, University of Nottingham, UK. My thanks to Kerry Senior for her 
invaluable research assistance on this chapter.  
1 For more detail on EU sanctions see Chapter 4 of this volume by Marco Gestri. 
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The post-Cold War period has seen a sharp move towards ‘smart’ sanctions against individuals or 
entities deemed responsible for breaches of international law or threats to international peace and 
security. This comports with a move in international law to supplement, but not replace, state 
responsibility with individual responsibility for breaches of international law. The main motivation 
has been to ensure that innocent citizens and civilians are not punished for the wrongdoings of their 
leaders. This is part of the move towards protecting human security alongside, but not instead of, state 
security and generally towards the protection of civilians.2 This trend was identified by the UN’s High 
Level Panel in its 2004 report ‘A More Secure World’: 
As a result of growing concern over the humanitarian impact of comprehensive sanctions, the Security 
Council stopped imposing them after the cases of Iraq, former Yugoslavia and Haiti, and turned exclusively 
to the use of financial, diplomatic, arms, aviation, travel and commodity sanctions, targeting the belligerents 
and policy makers most directly responsible for reprehensible policies.3 
 
While these new-style targeted sanctions have raised their own human rights concerns in terms of due 
process, rights to property, privacy and freedom of movement, they are quantitatively less than the 
human rights impact of punitive sanctions imposed against a state and, therefore, against the 
population of a state, as shown by the massive suffering caused to the people of Iraq by the collective 
comprehensive sanctions imposed from 1991-2003;4 and that caused to the people of Cuba by 
unilateral sanctions imposed by the US against Cuba from 1960 onwards.5 To quote again from the 
High Level Panel Report of 2004: 
 
Targeted sanctions (financial, travel, aviation or arms embargoes) are useful for putting pressure on leaders 
and elites with minimal humanitarian consequences, provide a less costly alternative to other options and 
can be tailored to specific circumstances. By isolating violators of international standards and laws, even 
modest sanctions measures (including sports embargoes) can serve an important symbolic purpose. The 
threat of sanctions can be a powerful means of deterrence and prevention.6 
 
The High Level Panel made it clear that the move to smart sanctions had to be combined with better 
monitoring, implementation and enforcement to make them more effective.7 There can be little doubt 
that smart sanctions imposed against the regimes of Saddam Hussein or Fidel Castro would have been 
better for the populations of Iraq and Cuba but the question remains as to whether such measures 
imposed against members of a regime or government are going to affect sufficient change in 
behaviour as to be an adequate replacements or alternatives to general sanctions. 
 
The move towards smart or targeted sanctions is, perhaps too readily, explained as a development of 
more precise, more surgical measures against states, or more accurately state leaders but also against 
‘elites’ within states. In a sense, such measures may be best considered as measures against state 
actors; given that the leaders of states are paradigmatic state agents.8 So it may be argued that they are 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but this really depends upon the scope of the measures: whether they 
are confined to paradigmatic state agents or whether they extend more broadly to cover influential and 
powerful persons within a state’s elite. In this instance, sanctions are a mixture of measures against 
                                                          
2 See UN Doc A/RES/66/290 (2012), containing the United Nations’ current understanding of human security. 
3 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A more secure world: 
our shared responsibility’ (UN, 2004) para 80. 
4 J. Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions (Harvard University Press 2010) 86-102. 
5 N.D. White, The Cuban Embargo Under International Law: El Bloqueo (Routledge 2015) 99-124. 
6 High Level Panel (2004), above n.3, para 179. 
7 Ibid., para 180. See also Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of 
Sanctions (UN Doc S/2006/997). 
8 Their acts being those of the state under Articles 4 and 5, Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001. 
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state actors and NSA’s. This type of ‘mixed’ regime was initially applied to Libya in 2011, when the 
resolutions contained non-forcible measures against a range of individuals from the regime and from 
Gaddafi’s family.9 Those measures were imposed in part to fulfil the Security Council’s primary 
responsibility for peace and security but also, in part, as a response to crimes against humanity that 
appeared to have been committed in Libya, necessitating a referral to the International Criminal 
Court.10 As the post-Gaddafi era in Libya descended into violence and chaos, the Security Council 
again found itself imposing measures against NSAs in Libya (including Al-Qaida and Islamic State) 
on the basis of a threat to the peace, but also targeting individuals planning or committing violations 
of international human rights and humanitarian law.11  
 
The confusion over whether the term NSAs covers regime elites is largely due to the lack of legal 
definition of NSA which is, in itself, something of an ‘empty term’, comprising as it does ‘actors 
which apparently only have in common that they are not the state, and not governmental’.12 Whether 
spouses of Presidents or Prime Ministers of countries are state or non-state actors is a question that 
would potentially fill a whole chapter, but the telling question is whether it makes any real difference 
to whether sanctions may be lawfully imposed on them as well as the legal parameters governing the 
application of such measures. As has been stated, once international law was supplemented with 
notions of individual responsibility as well as state responsibility for breaches of international law, 
there may seem to be no reason to doubt the legality of such measures. However, whereas the vast 
majority of breaches of international law can give rise to state responsibility there are only specific 
regimes, such as international criminal law and aspects of others such as international humanitarian 
law, the violation of which can give rise to individual responsibility. This signifies that if sanctions 
are imposed on individuals for a violation of international law it can only be for breach of those norms 
or because the violative conduct of the individual is imputable to the state. It would also have to be 
established that states or organisations imposing such measures have the right or duty to do so under 
international law. However, if sanctions are imposed in order to tackle threats to international peace 
presented by the activities of individuals, or groups of individuals, then there is no need to establish 
norm violation; the key question is then whether the state or organization imposing sanctions in such 
circumstances has the right or power to do so.   
 
With exceptions such as Haiti in the 1990s,13 and Libya in 2011, the UN has often failed to adopt 
smart sanctions against state leaders (witnessed by the inconclusive debates on Zimbabwe and 
Syria),14 although historically it has engaged in limited sanctions against states in the form of arms 
embargoes, starting with that imposed against South Africa in 1977.15 The UN has concentrated its 
targeted sanctions against non-state actors such as members of terrorist and rebel groups. Indeed, it 
                                                          
9 UN Doc S/RES/1970 (2011) op paras 15-17, explicitly invoked Article 41 of the UN Charter and imposed a 
travel on listed individuals (members of the regime, and Gaddafi’s family), an assets freeze on individuals under 
a separate list (a shorter list of members of Gaddafi’s family). 
10 Ibid, op para 4. 
11 UN Doc S/RES/2213 (2015) op para 11(a). 
12 A. Peters, L. Koechlin, G.F. Zinkernagel, ‘Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: Framing an Issue in an 
Interdisciplinary Fashion’ in A. Peters, L. Koechlin, T. Forster, G.F. Zinkernagerl (eds), Non-State Actors as 
Standard Setters (Cambridge University Press 2009) 14. 
13 UN Doc S/RES/841 (1993). Note, however, that these were imposed against the de facto authorities in Haiti 
i.e. a military regime that had overthrown the democratically elected (under UN supervision) government of 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide – J.M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2007) 326. See also targeted sanctions imposed against the military junta that had seized power from the 
democratically elected authorities of Haiti in 1997 – UN Doc S/RES 1132 (1997). 
14  In July 2008, Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution (UN Doc S/2008/447) that would have imposed and 
arms embargo and targeted sanctions (travel ban and assets freeze) against President  Mugabe and 13 top 
military and government officials in Zimbabwe following a flawed and violent elections process (UN Doc S/PV 
5933, 11 July 2008). In October 2011 Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution (UN Doc S/2011/612) that 
threatened measures under Article 41 against members of the Syrian regime (UN S/PV 6627, 4 October 2011).  
15 UN Doc S/RES/418 (1977). 
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has been argued that for the UN the concept of NSAs is confined to such groups.16 Thus, the story of 
the development of smart sanctions is not simply one of a response to humanitarian concerns arising 
from general sanctions against states, since the UN had established practice of imposing such 
sanctions against NSAs, for example, with such measures taken against UNITA in 1993, before full 
evidence of the damage caused by comprehensive sanctions against Iraq was known. 
 
Subject to the point made above (re smart sanctions taken against ‘elites’ and the difficulty of 
delineating state from non-state in that ‘elite’) it is important to keep in mind the distinction between 
smart sanctions against state actors and those taken against NSAs as they arise from different political 
contexts. Smart sanctions against leaders of states are successors to those imposed generally against 
states; they are taken within the modern inter-state paradigm, while sanctions against NSAs are part of 
the post-Cold War move towards enforcing individual responsibility in a broad sense within a post-
modern paradigm where sovereignty is variable and international relations are not solely structured 
around the state. However, although in part a development of the idea of individual responsibility, it 
will be shown that UN sanctions imposed against NSAs primarily aim to tackle threats to peace and 
security posed by these actors, and not to punish those actors for breaches of international law for 
which they might be individually responsible, and in that way they share characteristics with sanctions 
imposed against states. Sanctions imposed by the US and the EU are more mixed in terms of what 
they are aimed at – NSA behaviour that is a threat to peace and security or behaviour that is a breach 
of international norms. 
 
The realisation that NSAs could represent a real (existential) threat to established state actors, 
culminating in states and state-based organizations taking coercive measures against them, was 
something of a slow process. In fact, the early post-Cold War instances of sanctions against NSAs 
were imposed against those holding power but who had not attained full status as state actors; 
measures in the 1990s were imposed against de facto governments (e.g. Taliban) or rebel groups with 
de facto belligerent status (e.g. UNITA).17 Even historically the first UN sanctions regime was 
imposed against the illegitimate white racist regime in S. Rhodesia in the late 1960s, a de facto 
government, though the measures imposed were not targeted and had a wider impact on the 
population.18 This shows that the first ‘generation’ of smart sanctions against NSAs were 
pragmatically driven measures against those in control of territories even though they had not 
achieved recognition as legitimate leaders of states. A clear departure in the UN from measures 
analogous to sanctions against states was only taken with the extension of the Taliban sanctions 
regime imposed in 1999 to Al-Qaida in 2000 and, in so doing, removing the link between Al Qaida 
and the territory of Afghanistan,19 which in 2011 was followed by the complete separation of the two 
regimes (discussed below). 
 
A contrast can be made with measures taken by the EU which, because of the narrower state 
consensus necessary to take decisions to impose sanctions and broader agreement on the values to be 
protected or promoted, shows a faster and deeper trend towards sanctions directed against regime 
elites (for example, in Zimbabwe and Russia),20 although lesser development has occurred as regards 
NSAs such as terrorist groups.21 Targeted EU sanctions were initially imposed in 2002 by the Council 
                                                          
16 P. Alston, ‘The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-
State Actors?’ in P. Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2005) 17. 
17 Both discussed later in the chapter. 
18 UN Doc S/RES 232 (1966). 
19 Farrall, supra n.13, at 131. 
20 See, for example, EU targeted sanctions against regime individuals in Zimbabwe (Council Decision 
2011/101/CFSP, OJ L 42, 16 February 2011, p.6) and Syria (Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP OJ L 147, 1 June 
2013, p.14). Targeted sanctions were imposed against certain Russian individuals responsible for actions which 
undermined or threatened the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine following 
intervention in Ukraine (Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP, OJ L 78, 17 March 2014, p. 16). 
21 Measures against Al Qaida in Common Position 2002/402/CFSP, OJ L 139, 29 May 2002, p.4; measures 
against individuals and entities associated with Al Qaida in Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2000, OJ L 139, 
29 May 2002, p.9. See also Common Position 2001/931/CFSP OJ L 344, 28 December 2001, p.93; Council 
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against individuals in Zimbabwe on the basis of its assessment that the ‘Government of Zimbabwe 
continues to engage in serious violations of human rights and of the freedom of opinion, of 
association and of peaceful assembly’. It decided that ‘for as long as the violations occur the Council 
deems it necessary to introduce restrictive measures against the Government of Zimbabwe and those 
who bear a wide responsibility for such violations’. 22 
 
The EU’s measures are clearly framed as a response to a violation of international human rights 
standards occurring in Zimbabwe. In contrast, in the case of measures imposed by the US in relation 
to Zimbabwe, the initial Executive Order of the President in 2003 ‘determined that the actions and 
policies of certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons to undermine 
Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions contributing to the deliberate breakdown in the rule 
of law in Zimbabwe, to politically motivated violence and intimidation in that country, and to political 
and economic instability in the southern African region, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat 
to the foreign policy of the United States’, and declared ‘a national emergency to deal with that 
threat’.23  The formula of an executive Presidential Order finding of a threat to the foreign policy and 
national security of the United States and declaring a national emergency to deal with the threat has 
been used on a number of occasions by the US to tackle a variety of perceived threats by imposing 
targeted sanctions against individuals and other NSAs,24 although other more normative based 
determinations such as violations of human rights have been used by Congress to pass legislation 
imposing targeted sanctions as well.25  The Presidential executive power to impose sanctions, derived 
from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) originally adopted in 1977,26 has 
been criticised on the grounds that ‘experience with IEEPA raises concerns that it may be used 
casually for spurious national emergencies’.27   
 
 
3. The Nature and Purposes of Sanctions Against NSAs 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, OJ L 344, 28 December 2001, freezing funds and economic resources of certain 
persons, groups and entities with a view to combating terrorism. 
22 Restrictive measures against Zimbabwe in Common Position 2002/145/CFSP, OJ L 50/1, 21 February 2002. 
23 Executive Order 13288—Blocking Property of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in 
Zimbabwe, 68 FR 11457 March 10, 2003. 
24 See for example: Executive Order 13611—Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or 
Stability of Yemen 77 FR May 16, 2012; Executive Order 13338—Blocking Property of Certain Persons and 
Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria, 69 FR 26751 May 13, 2004; Executive Order 13067—
Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan, 62 FR 59989, November 5, 
1997; Executive Order 13664—Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to South Sudan FR April 3, 
2014; Executive Order 13536—Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia 
April 13, 2010; Executive Order 13660—Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in 
Ukraine, 79 FR 13493, March 10 2014; Executive Order 13466—Continuing Certain Restrictions With Respect 
to North Korea and North Korean Nationals 73 FR 36787 June 27, 2008; Executive Order 13566—Blocking 
Property and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya, 76 FR 11315 February 25, 2011; Executive 
Order 13441—Blocking Property Of Persons Undermining The Sovereignty Of Lebanon Or Its Democratic 
Processes And Institutions 72 FR 43499 August 3, 2007; Executive Order 12722— Blocking Iraqi Government 
Property And Prohibiting Transactions With Iraq, 55 FR 31803 August 3, 1990; Executive Order 13413—
Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 71 
FR 64105, October 31, 2006; Executive Order 13396—Blocking of Property of Certain Persons Contributing to 
the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire 71 FR 7389, February 10, 2006; Executive Order 13310—Blocking Property of the 
Government of Burma and Prohibiting Certain Transactions 68 FR 44853, July 30, 2003; Executive Order 
13405—Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus 71 
FR 35485, June 20, 2006; Executive Order 13219—Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten International 
Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans, 68 FR 34777, June 29, 2001. 
25 For example: S.2142 - Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, 113th Congress, 
(2013-2014). See also notes 57-58 below.  
26 50 U.S.C. 1701-2 (1982). 
27 B.E. Carter, ‘International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime’ (1987) 75 
California Law Review 1159 at 1238. 
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The legal nature of sanctions under international law, whether imposed against state actors or NSAs, 
has not been fully agreed upon,28 and so it is important to try shed light on this while considering the 
nature and purpose of sanctions specifically taken against NSAs. The problem for international 
lawyers is that while analogies with domestic legal orders can often be misleading, in general terms, 
sanctions are central to any legal system, whether national or international. Kelsen takes this truism 
and applies it to the international legal order, arguing that sanctions are an inherent component of any 
legal order including one providing for collective security. Kelsen wrote that ‘a social order 
guaranteeing collective security is by its very nature a legal order, and a legal order is a system of 
norms providing for sanctions’.29 Sanctions, for Kelsen, are ‘coercive reactions against an actual 
violation of the law’, or alternatively, against suspected or expected violations.30 This formulation 
does allow for some anticipatory sanctions but the trigger remains an actual or potential violation of 
the law. However, it is clear that in the international order, especially in its collective security 
component, ‘sanctions’ are not confined to actual or potential violations of international law, rather 
the primary triggers are actual or threatened ruptures of the peace. Kelsen accepts that legal systems 
generally recognise the legitimacy of coercive measures that have no relation to actual or potential 
violations of the law but remain necessary to maintain or restore peace and security. However, the 
examples given by Kelsen show that this is the exception rather than the rule within national legal 
orders; his examples include the forcible destruction of buildings to prevent the spread of fire, or the 
forcible internment of people suffering infectious diseases in order to prevent an epidemic from 
spreading.31 Arguably in the international order these sorts of exceptions are the norm, so that 
sanctions are imposed to address threats to the peace, whether or not those threats entails actual or 
possible violations of the law.32 However, the trend towards sanctions against NSAs might be 
indicative of a move towards punishment for violations of the law being the primary aim, given that 
this development has occurred against the background of a move towards addressing individual 
responsibility for core crimes. The examples given in this chapter include a consideration of whether 
there has been a move towards sanctions being imposed for breaches of international law.  
 
Given that the overriding purpose of targeted sanctions against NSAs, whether to punish or prevent, is 
to change the behaviour of individuals either directly (to stop them for example from committing 
terrorist acts) or indirectly (to influence states or NSAs to stop them supporting the acts or threats that 
are of concern), it is important to discern whether it is behaviour that constitutes a threat or the 
behaviour that constitutes the crime that it the target. The intended deterrent aspect of sanctions as 
punishment is to prevent future breaches, whereas the deterrent effects of sanctions to tackle threats to 
the peace is the immediate end of the behaviour that comprises the threat.  Of course the dichotomy of 
threat and crime is not always easy to maintain and criminal behaviour, particularly at the 
international level, can be a (part of) a wider threat to international peace.33 When imposing targeted 
                                                          
28 F. Dopagne, ‘Sanctions and Countermeasures by International Organizations’ in R. Collins and N.D. White 
(eds), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional Independence in the International 
Legal Order (Routledge 2011) 180. 
29 H. Kelsen, Collective Security under International Law (Naval War College 1957) 101. For alternative 
positivist views of sanctions see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 1961) 91-5; J.L. Brierly, 
‘Sanctions’ (1932) 17 Transactions of the Grotius Society 68. 
30 Kelsen, above n.29 at 102. 
31 Ibid. 
32 J.L. Kunz, ‘Sanctions in International Law’ (1960) 52 AJIL 324 at 329. But see V. Gowlland-Debbas (ed), 
United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer, 2001) 7-9. 
33 See for example UN Doc S/RES/1857 (2008) op para 4, which, inter alia, imposed measures against: political 
and military leaders of foreign armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who impede 
the disarmament and the voluntary repatriation or resettlement of combatants belonging to those groups; as well 
as political and military leaders operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and recruiting or using 
children in armed conflicts in violation of applicable international law; and individuals operating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and committing serious violations of international law involving the 
targeting of children or women in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, 
abduction and forced displacement. 
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measures against NSAs in the Central African Republic, the UN Security Council, acting under a 
general determination that the violence there constituted a threat to regional peace and stability, 
imposed measures against individuals who were involved in planning, directing, or committing acts 
that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law;34 as well as against 
individuals ‘engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of 
the CAR, including acts that threaten or violate transitional agreements, or that threaten or impede the 
political transition process, including a transition toward free and fair democratic elections, or that 
fuel violence’.35  
 
Nonetheless, there is stark difference between the nature and purpose of sanctions imposed against 
NSAs (for example members of a rebel group) aimed at bringing them to the negotiating table, and 
sanctions imposed on them as punishment for crimes they might have committed during their 
insurgency. Furthermore, analysis might reveal that it is better to separate out different forms of non-
forcible measures and confine ‘sanctions’ to a narrow response to breaches of international law. 
Arguably such sanctions are more clearly grounded within the legal order than sanctions imposed to 
tackle an emergency situation arising from threats to peace and security. In this regard it may be 
argued that there are the equivalent of ‘non-derogable’ rights and duties, to borrow an analogy with 
human rights law,36 in the context of collective security responses to threats, but the legal framework 
is arguably pared down in international emergencies especially when the UN Security Council is 
acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
This is not an argument for saying that there is no international legal order, but it is suggesting that the 
order is weak and so there is greater discretion within it to deal with what might be called the pre-
legal conditio sine qua non – that there is sufficient peace and security to preserve, or upon which to 
build, a legal order; what Hart might call the minimum content of natural law – self-evident 
conditions and norms of public order.37 Just as an infectious disease might temporarily justify that 
exercise of discretionary executive power at the national level, at the international level the equivalent 
of infectious diseases or rampant fires in the form of threats to international peace caused by civil 
wars, refugee flows, natural disasters, famine, climate change, arms proliferation, and yes infectious 
diseases, none of which are breaches of international law per se, are unfortunately too prevalent to be 
dealt with as the exception within the international legal order. 
 
 
 
4. The Legal Basis of Sanctions Against NSAs 
 
Further arguments for developing a more sophisticated legal typology of sanctions can be made when 
considering the variety of legal bases for sanctions against NSAs, ranging from measures taken under 
the framework of collective (international and regional) security law, to measures taken as a form of 
collective or unilateral countermeasures by states against influential actors within states, to forms of 
collective, multilateral and unilateral (criminal) punishment. The lack of clarity as to the legal basis 
and nature of targeted sanctions is encapsulated in the dispute about whether such measures, when 
imposed by the UN Security Council, are administrative or preventive measures, or forms of criminal 
punishment.38   
                                                          
34 UN Doc S/RES/2134 (2014) op para 37(b). 
35 UN Doc S/RES/2196 (2015) op para 11. 
36 See Article 4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. 
37 Hart, above n.29 at 188. N. Tsagourias and N.D. White, Collective Security: Theory, Law and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 221. 
38 See for example Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v. Belgium, Communication No. 1472/2006, 29 December 
2008, 16 IHHR 427 where the Human Rights Committee was of the view that such measures were 
administrative in nature and therefore did not attract due process guarantees; while the European Court of 
Justice in Joined Cases C-402/05 P and c-415/05, P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-
6351,  found that they did violate such rights. 
N.D. White, Final Draft, 5 June 2015 
 
8 
 
 
A preliminary consideration of sanctions against NSAs would suggest that UN measures, at least, are 
certainly focused on the threat to the peace represented by the purposes, actions and activities of the 
targeted NSAs, rather than the punishment of individuals for actual or potential breaches of 
international law; while EU and other regional sanctions regimes tend to promote wider values other 
than peace and security, such as democracy and human rights.39 US sanctions, as stated above, are 
often premised on threats to national security, although they are directed at responding to breaches of 
international law such as human rights law and to upholding wider values such as democracy and the 
rule of law. Unilateral sanctions by powerful states are imposed for a variety of reasons and under a 
range of legal justifications, from promoting human rights and democracy, to punishing individuals 
for international crimes and acts of terrorism. Unilateral sanctions, for example by the US against 
Cuba, are at least in part responses to breaches of international law; in that case the initial 
expropriations of UN properties and assets by Cuba following the revolution of 1959, the 
interventions by Cuba in Latin America and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, with a focus from the 
1980s on the denial of democracy and civil/political rights in Cuba; but they are also clearly 
ideologically motivated and a product of domestic US politics and law.40 Such on-going measures 
raise issues of the legality of the sanctions per se: as countermeasures, more broadly as forms of 
economic coercion, but they clearly violate general principles of international law of non-intervention 
and self-determination, and also more specific norms such as and socio-economic rights.41 These are 
not temporary measures aimed at ending a violation of international law by Cuba, and restoring 
normal relations between the two states, but are aimed at the form of government in Cuba and at 
changing that regime.42 The question is whether unilateral sanctions targeted at NSAs suffer from the 
same legal problems, or whether they are a ‘smarter’ form of measure designed to deter or punish 
those within states, and whether, as such, they operate within the confines of international law. The 
endemic problem even with this more precise form of sanctions is that, if they are punishment for 
violations of international law, they do not necessarily follow from any judicial determination of guilt, 
thereby rendering it automatically a violation of due process rights. This in part might explain why the 
US sanctions against NSAs are normally taken somewhat disingenuously under executive order as an 
emergency response to perceived threats to national security, which US Courts (in line with many 
national courts) are generally unwilling to challenge.43 
 
Nonetheless, there does seem to be a gulf between the legal nature of collective sanctions designed to 
tackle threats, and unilateral sanctions designed to punish governments, regime elites and NSAs. As 
lawyers we may want to separate them for analysis, in particular by not viewing collective measures 
aimed at threats as ‘sanctions’ but as ‘coercive non-forcible measures’;44 leaving us free to review the 
legality of each: collective and coercive non-forcible measures designed to restore public order, and 
unilateral punitive measures that are measures of self-help taken in response to alleged breaches of 
                                                          
39 See, for example, Article 2(b) of the Charter of the Organizations of American States 1948 (as amended); 
Article 3(g)(h) Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000; Article 3.5 Treaty on European Union 2012 
(consolidated version). For the relationship between regional organizations to the UN legal order, especially 
Article 53, which provides that regional enforcement action must be taken under the authority of the UNSC see 
N.D. White, ‘The EU as a Regional Security Actor within the International Legal Order’ in M. Trybus and N.D. 
White (eds), European Security Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 329, where law and practice are analysed 
to show that non-forcible measures are not fully within the restrictions imposed by Article 53.  
40 P.J Haney and W. Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy 
University of Pittsburgh Press 2005) 1-10. 
41 White, above n.5 at 139-44. 
42 On the limitations of countermeasures see Articles 49-54 Articles on State Responsibility 2001, above n.7. 
43 Carter, above n.27 at 1238. 
44 Although the UNSC sometimes uses the term ‘sanctions’ for its non-forcible measures imposed under Chapter 
VII. See, for example, UN Doc S/RES/1333 (2000) op para 25, in which the UNSC ‘Expresses its readiness to 
consider the imposition of further measures, in accordance with its responsibility under the Charter of the United 
Nations, with the aim of achieving full implementation of this resolution and resolution 1267 (1999), inter alia, 
taking into account the impact assessment referred to in paragraph 15 (d) with a view to enhancing the 
effectiveness of sanctions and avoiding humanitarian consequences’. 
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international law. The question then is whether the doctrine of countermeasures is sufficient to contain 
and regulate sanctions;45 whereas when we are considering coercive non-forcible measures designed 
to tackle threats the legal parameters are potentially much broader, although it is contended they 
cannot disregard basic obligations of international law including those of human rights, especially 
ones of due diligence, applicable to the UN as an international legal person and as such subject to 
duties under customary international law.46 As obligations of conduct not result,47 due diligence 
obligations would require the UN to take measures to prevent, as far as possible, its actions having 
consequences for the human rights of the civilian population. For instance, during  UN sanctions 
against the Haitian junta in the 1990s, there was strong evidence that the regime elite benefited from 
the black market that sprang up to compensate for the restrictions caused by sanctions, thereby 
pushing the general population further into poverty.48 It is questionable whether the humanitarian 
exception, standard in UN sanctions regimes, is enough to consider that the UN has fulfilled its due 
diligence obligations in these cases.49  
 
Further analysis of practice reveals the legal effect of sanctions against NSAs, showing that they 
generally are applicable to (member) states when imposed by the UN or regional organization, 
binding them under the provisions of the constitutive treaty.50 UN sanctions do not have direct effect 
within states, it is for states to implement them within their legal orders, for example, by making it 
illegal to trade with the targeted NSAs or requiring banks to freeze their assets, and the same is the 
case for regional organizations (with the EU’s legal order being exceptional in this regard). The 
difficulty is that these obligations are not directed at the NSA, their immediate impact is on states and 
then in turn upon other actors such as banks, companies and individuals, by requiring them to act in 
certain ways towards the NSAs in order to restrict and isolate them so that their behaviour is curtailed. 
The focus on the state in terms of compliance with sanctions regimes is a natural result of the on-
going restrictive form of international legal order based on states that has not fundamentally changed 
even with the advent of powerful NSAs. Just as it is very difficult to make international law directly 
applicable to multinational businesses,51 we encounter the same problem with rebel groups, 
insurgents, organized criminals, terrorists etc.  
 
Just as we might quibble with the term ‘sanctions’, we also might object to the rest of the title to this 
chapter ‘against NSAs’, because what we are really talking about, in the main, are coercive non-
forcible measures placing duties upon states to take measures against NSAs, most commonly 
indirectly (by obliging legal persons within their domestic legal, such as banks and other financial 
institutions,  to undertake certain measures, such as the freezing of funds and assets, against the NSAs 
under penalty for non-compliance). One interesting aspect to unravel here is the role of domestic 
criminal law as a weapon potentially used by states to fulfil their obligations to the UN, imposed by 
binding decisions on matters of peace and security, although normally the UN Security Council only 
calls upon states to bring proceedings and impose penalties against violators.52 The legitimacy of 
                                                          
45 J. Crawford, ‘The Relationship between Sanctions and Countermeasures’ in V. Gowlland-Debbas (ed), United 
Nations Sanctions and International Law  (Kluwer 2001) 57. 
46 The idea of duties of due diligence applying to the UN is only just gaining traction within the UN, although 
this does not mean that the UN is not so bound. See, for example, H.P. Aust, ‘The UN Human Rights Due 
Diligence Policy: An Effective Mechanisms against Complicity of Peacekeeping Forces?’ (2015) 20 Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 61.   
47 S. Marks and F. Azizi, ‘Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights Obligations’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet 
and S. Olleson (eds) The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2010)728-9. 
48 S. Chesterman, T.M Franck and D.M. Malone, Law and Practice of the United Nations: Documents and 
Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 359-60. 
49 But see Farrall, above n.13 at 224-7, who argues that proportionality is the applicable standard. 
50 For example, Article 25 UN Charter 1945; Article 215 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (as 
consolidated) 2012.  
51 See, example, the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 2011 (HR/PUB/11/04). 
52 For example, UN Doc S/RES/1267 (1999) op para 8, the UN Security Council ‘calls upon States to bring 
proceedings against persons and entities within their jurisdiction that violate the measures imposed by paragraph 
4 above and to impose appropriate penalties’. 
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criminal sanctions being derived from measures aimed at tackling threats to the peace is enhanced if 
we see such measures as a response to breaches of public order norms rather than the exercise of 
purely discretionary power by the UN Security Council which, in turn, requires us to conceptualise 
‘peace’ and ‘security’ as part of the international legal order. The Security Council has directly 
required states to criminalise the behaviour of NSAs or their supporters within their domestic legal 
orders, but this was in the form of a piece of ‘legislation’ in Resolution 1373 of 2001, aimed at 
tackling the general threat posed by international terrorism rather than one imposing ‘sanctions’ 
against specific threats.53 
 
Certainly for those sanctions imposed against NSAs for the purpose of dealing with existential threats 
to states and their citizens, there are strong arguments that they should, at least temporarily, have 
priority over other obligations that states might have. Just as it might be necessary to temporarily 
suspend some human rights in times of genuine emergency when the life of the nation is threatened, 
and only for so long as it is under threat, so will it be necessary to suspend competing duties and 
rights when trying to tackle threats to international peace and security. The debates about Article 103 
of the Charter veers between two polar interpretations of its provisions, so as to either assert 
supremacy over any competing or conflicting obligations including fundamental rights, or to deny its 
primacy altogether;54 while the approach of the European Court of Human Rights suggests a more 
practical approach - that the UN Security Council may be able to override clearly conflicting duties 
and rights in certain circumstances if it is explicit about what it is doing and presumably why it is 
doing it.55 The fact that to date it has not done so indicates that the Security Council is not confident in 
fulfilling its role as an international executive tasked with protecting international public order norms. 
UN Security Council practice in invoking the language of Article 103 is also equivocal as the case 
studies reveal.56  
 
It must be noted too that there have been attempts by the US to assert supremacy of its unilateral 
sanctions in a different way, for instance those imposed against Cuba, namely by preventing other 
states and their nationals, as well as US companies and nationals, from trading with Cuba.57 Some US 
measures taken against Iran also purport to apply to foreign companies and nationals although, as with 
Cuba, these measures are only enforceable against foreign companies and nationals before US 
courts.58 These actions by the US can perhaps be seen as indicative that it has pretensions towards 
seeing itself, due to its power and its ideological history of exceptionalism,59 as some form of 
international executive with power over wider issues of peace and security, but it is questionable 
whether this is an accurate characterization, certainly in the case of US sanctions imposed against 
NSAs. These are justified at least as measures under national law to tackle a national emergency and 
                                                          
53 UN Doc S/RES/1373 (2001) op para 2.  
54 See generally R. Liivoja, ‘The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the UN Charter’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 583 
55 Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, Application No.27021/08, Judgment 7 July 2011; Nada v. Switzerland, 
Application No. 10593/08, 12 September 2012 
56 But see Bernhardt, ‘Article 103’, in B. Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd 
edn Oxford University Press 2002) 1300, where the author states, after noting the formula used whereby the 
UNSC ‘calls upon’ all states and other state-based actors to act in accordance with the provisions of the 
resolution notwithstanding the existence of rights and obligations under treaties, agreements, contracts or 
licences: ‘It is interesting to note that the present standard formula does not expressly refer to Art. 103, but is 
obviously based on this Article (and Art. 25) of the Charter. At the same time the formula is broader than Art. 
103 in several respects. It is not only addressed to States (to all States), but also to international and regional 
organizations, and it includes rights and obligations derived from contracts, licences and permits. In conclusion, 
it seems now to be generally recognized in practice that binding SC decisions taken under Chapter VII 
supersede all other commitments’.  
57 By the Helms-Burton Act 1996 (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Liberated) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C 
§ 6021-609). See A. Reinisch, ‘A Few Public International Law Comments on the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996’ (1996) 7 EJIL 545.   
58 See, for example, the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note. 
59 A. Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Exceptionalism and the Empire of Right (Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux 1996). 
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threat to the US represented by the activities of dangerous NSAs. Although there is evidence of such 
measures being extended to foreign companies and nationals who have breached sanctions imposed 
against NSAs,60 such extensions would seem necessary at least to make the measures effective and, in 
any case, are restricted in application to sanction-breakers found within US jurisdiction.61 Certainly in 
the case of collective sanctions, and given the mobility, as well as the foreign nationality, of most 
NSAs, it seems inevitable that sanctions directed at them and their behaviour can only be made to 
work effectively if the secondary measures necessary to alter the behaviour of companies and 
individuals towards those targeted should at least be applicable to foreign nationals and companies 
whichever jurisdiction they enter or are located within.  
 
The problem with US sanctions against NSAs is that they are often imposed unilaterally, or go beyond 
those measures imposed by the UN Security Council, thereby subjecting foreign companies and 
individuals within US jurisdiction to penalties for their dealings elsewhere which have not been 
agreed at the international level.  Nonetheless, these measures could be defensible legally if they can 
be seen either as the legitimate application of temporary countermeasures to enforce fundamental 
norms of the international community or, even more controversially, the unilateral enforcement of 
international public order norms. Both of these are controversial legal bases as the legality of 
countermeasures to enforce fundamental  international laws was left open in the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001,62 although there is state practice to 
support such a right.63 The legality of enforcing international public order norms based on unilateral 
perceptions of peace and security would seem to be even more problematic not only in terms of the 
basic rules governing coercion in international relations but also for the stability of those relations.  
The characterisation of sanctions as domestic measures to respond to national emergencies, as stated 
in US executive orders, cannot normally shield them from the international legal order as the targets 
are often a combination of government figures and members of regime elites in another state – in 
other words they are part of inter-state relations and, therefore, governed by international law. Even 
international terrorist organisations, though not part of state structures, are located in other countries 
and therefore measures aimed at them, even largely taken within domestic legal orders, are subject to 
the norms of international law.  
 
 
5. Implementation and Accountability 
 
The typical method of implementation used by the UN Security Council for most of its sanctions 
regimes is the creation of a sanctions committee as a subsidiary organ, the task of which is to receive 
and review state reports on implementation.64 However, this has become more sophisticated over the 
years, and studies show how these methods of implementation and oversight have been adapted to 
sanctions against NSAs involving an increasing role for experts (in themselves another form of 
NSA).65 The Informal Working Group of the Security Council on sanctions has recommended 
measures to improve the effectiveness of sanctions. In 2006 it reported that: 
                                                          
60 See, for example, Executive Order 13608—Prohibiting Certain Transactions With and Suspending Entry Into 
the United States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders With Respect to Iran and Syria, 77 FR 26409, May 3, 2012. 
61 See, for example, Executive Order 13622—Authorizing Additional Sanctions With Respect to Iran, 77 FR 
45897, July 30, 2012, which, inter alia, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, to prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the 
United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by any foreign financial institution that 
has knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction with the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC) or Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO). 
62 Article 54 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001. 
63 E. Katselli-Proukaki, The Problem of Enforcement in International Law: Countermeasures, the Non-Injured 
State and the Idea of International Community (Routledge 2010) 102-209.  
64 On Sanctions Committees see Chapter 8 of this volume by Thilo Marauhn and Ignaz Stegmiller. 
65 J. Farrall, ‘Should the United Nations Security Council Leave it to the Experts? The Governance and 
Accountability of UN Sanctions Monitoring’ in J. Farrall and K. Rubenstein (eds), Sanctions, Accountability 
and Governance in a Globalised World (Cambridge University Press 2009) 191 at 209; criticises the UN 
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For targeted sanctions to be effective, appropriate action must be taken at all decision-making levels: the 
Security Council, the sanctions committee, Member States and their administrative agencies. Proper design, 
implementation, ongoing evaluation and follow-up of sanctions regimes are key elements that contribute to 
the effectiveness of sanctions.66 
 
Further: 
 
The establishment of sanctions monitoring mechanisms is an important innovation in the structure of 
Security Council sanctions regimes, which has contributed to more effective sanctions implementation. 
Through their inquiries in States affected by sanctions, these mechanisms have shed significant light on 
how targeted sanctions, including arms embargoes, are implemented, as well as on various possible ways 
that sanctions are violated. These mechanisms have contributed to an understanding of both the nature and 
scope of obstacles to more systematic compliance, thereby enhancing the overall capacity of the United 
Nations to refine and tighten targeted sanctions measures.67 
 
While effectiveness in targeting NSAs with the specific design of stopping them from acting in ways 
that threaten international peace and security is increasing we have to bear in mind the balance 
between effectiveness and legality.  It is interesting to note how the Working Group connects the two: 
 
Sanctions monitoring mechanisms are established by the Security Council in support of subsidiary organs. 
As such, they are organs with different and distinct mandates, of independent, expert and non-judiciary 
character, with no subpoena powers, whose primary role is to provide sanctions-related information to the 
relevant committees. However, given that the findings of the monitoring mechanisms (either their reports or 
documents or testimonies of their individual members), may be used by judicial authorities, their 
methodological standards may affect the credibility of the Organization.68 
 
Given that targeted measures against NSAs can be seen as situated at the interface of the international 
legal and political orders, challenging such measures is clearly problematic. This leads to a discussion 
of possible review and other mechanisms of accountability that may be available to the targets of 
sanctions. Under those sanctions against NSAs operated by means of listing individuals or entities, the 
process of listing in the UN is a relatively straightforward one whereby a state can request such. The 
relevant Committee (the 1267 Sanctions Committee for instance) then makes decisions, normally by 
consensus, to add to the list of targeted individuals or entities.69 Once an individual or entity is on a 
list the range of measures decided upon by the UN Security Council are imposed by member states 
carrying out their obligations under the UN Charter. The ‘listing of individuals is conceived as an 
executive or administrative process on the basis of perceived security threats, rather than a judicial 
one’ or penal one, ‘even though the listing results in a set of coercive measures, arguably de facto 
punishment, of those listed’.70 The process of delisting is seen in the UN as a political one, involving 
diplomatic protection and, more recently, access to an ombudsperson. Nonetheless, this has not 
prevented some targeted individuals from successfully bringing claims before judicial bodies: 
national, regional, and international, on the basis that their rights have been violated, the jurisprudence 
of which has been analysed elsewhere in this volume.71   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Security Council’s ‘delegation of sanctions responsibilities to independent expert bodies’ as amounting to 
‘outsourcing of its peace and security responsibilities’; and at 211 advocates the creation of permanent sanctions 
monitoring machinery within the UN Secretariat.    
66 Report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (UN Doc 
S/2006/997) para 2. 
67 Ibid., para 17. 
68 Ibid., para 19. 
69 The 1267 Committee was established by op para 6 UN Doc S/RES/1267 (1999). On the listing process and its 
lack of transparency see D. Hovell, ‘The Deliberative Deficit: Transparency, Access to Information and UN 
Sanctions’, in J. Farrall and K. Rubenstein (eds), above note 62, 92 at 93-96. 
70 Tsagourias and White, above n.37 at 239. 
71 See Chapter 9 by Monica Lugato in this volume. 
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In the case of targeted sanctions imposed against terrorist NSAs the temporary freezing of an 
individual’s assets, and restricting their movements, can constitute preventive administrative measures 
necessary to prevent the threat from terrorism manifesting itself in indiscriminate acts of violence. As 
such they are not subject to due process, at least fair trial, protections. However, a number of listings 
appear to be almost permanent without real review, and like indefinite preventive detention, cease to 
be a response to an imminent existential threat but are rather forms of punishment without due process 
of law. There is a clear need to be able to challenge these decisions, if sanctions against NSAs are to 
maintain their legitimacy as a modern and sophisticated form of tackling threats. There is a danger 
that by allowing for quasi-permanent listings the UN is endorsing a system of punishment for wrongs 
determined by executive organs of states and organizations without any determination or trial before a 
court. Rather like targeted killings, the roles of judge, jury and executioner are rolled together. This is 
even more so as regards the auto-interpretation system of targeted measures triggered by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted after 9/11 of 2001. This piece of UN Security Council law-
making has legitimated the development of separate ‘lists’ of terrorists by member states, fulfilling 
their obligations under that resolution to: criminalise the financing of terrorism; freeze any funds 
related to persons involved in acts of terrorism; deny all form of financial support for terrorist groups; 
suppress the provision of safe haven, sustenance or support for terrorists.72 Given that there are no 
specific terrorist organisations listed in the Resolution, or by a collective process set up by the 
Resolution, 1373 gives states discretion to target those organisations and individuals it considers to be 
terrorists. In the UK, for example, the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010 gives effect to Resolution 
1373 (2001) in the UK. The 2010 Act provides the UK government (HM Treasury) with powers to 
freeze the funds and economic resources of those suspected or believed to be involved in terrorist 
activities, and restricts the making available of funds, financial services and economic resources to, or 
for the benefit of, such persons.  
 
Resolution 1373 potentially allows states to list NSAs for a wide range of reasons some of which are 
only very loosely connected to peace and security. The Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate 
(CTED) was set up by the Security Council to provide the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 
established by Resolution 1373 with expert advice. In its Global Implementation Survey of 2009 
CTED identified problems within a number of states in implementing the obligations in 1373 
including: the lack of definition of terrorism in domestic law (or vague or overbroad definitions); 
arbitrary executions and detentions; torture and ill-treatment at the investigative stage; and the return 
of individuals to states in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.73   
 
 
6. Early Sanctions Regimes Against NSAs  
 
6.1 UNITA in Angola 
 
As has been stated targeted sanctions against NSAs are basically a post-Cold War phenomenon. The 
early examples are an extension of state-focused sanctions as they were directed against entities in 
control of territory, exemplified by the measures imposed by the UN Security Council against the 
Angolan rebel group – UNITA, an armed group fighting an internecine war against other factions and 
then the government since the mid-1970s.  By the early 1990s, with the Cold War props removed 
from the warring parties, signs of peace could be discerned. 
 
In Resolution 864, adopted on 15 September 1993, the UN Security Council strongly condemned 
UNITA and held ‘its leadership responsible for not having taken the necessary measures to comply 
with the demands made by the Council in its previous resolutions’; and expressed determination to 
‘ensure respect for its resolutions and the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz"’. The Security 
Council determined that ‘as a result of UNITA’s military actions’, the situation in Angola constituted 
‘a threat to international peace and security’, and then proceeded to act under Chapter VII of the 
                                                          
72 UN Doc S/RES/1373 (2001) op para 2. 
73 UN Doc S/2009/620. 
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Charter of the United Nations. The decision was a clear response to a threat to the peace for which 
UNITA was deemed responsible. Responsibility was for the continuing threat caused by failure to 
comply with the peace agreement. This was made clear in the operative parts of the Resolution that 
decided that the measures listed in the Resolution would come into force ten days after its adoption 
‘unless the Secretary-General notifies the Council that an effective cease-fire has been established and 
that agreement has been reached on the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant 
resolutions of the Security Council’.74 This was an express threat of sanctions unless UNITA fulfilled 
its obligations under the peace agreement. The primary aim was to change behaviour and thereby 
address the threat to the peace. The aim was to secure peace not to enforce compliance with 
international law, except if preventing and tackling threats can be understood as a form of 
enforcement of international public order norms of which compliance with an ‘internal’ peace 
agreement is a part.75 
 
The measures threatened by the Security Council, and then imposed when UNITA did not comply, 
initially required states to prevent the supply to UNITA of ‘arms and related matériel of all types, 
including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and spare parts for the afore-
mentioned, as well as of petroleum and petroleum products’.76 The sanctions matched the violations in 
the sense that the continuing threat had been caused by UNITA’s commitment to continue fighting, 
and the measures were aimed at cutting off its capacity to do so. Furthermore, the Security Council 
promised further measures including ‘trade measures against UNITA and restrictions on the travel of 
UNITA personnel’, unless the Secretary-General had reported by 1 November 1993 that an effective 
cease-fire had been established and that agreement had been reached ‘on the full implementation of 
the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Security Council’.77 The gradual ratcheting up of 
pressure against UNITA was manifested in subsequent resolutions of the Security Council as it 
continued to press UNITA into compliance with the peace agreement and, thereby, end the threat to 
the peace caused by UNITA. It was not until 1997 that travel restrictions were put in place on all 
senior UNITA officials and their families, combined with immediate closure of UNITA offices 
around the world and a denial of UNITA access to aircraft.78 This could be seen as introducing an 
element of punishment of UNITA members and denial of their rights – to freedom of movement – 
rather than simply measures imposed to address the threat caused by UNITA, but such broadening of 
measures is inevitable if the targets refuse to comply. The realisation of the potential impact of these 
broader measures led to the invocation for the first time in this case of the humanitarian exception 
clause, found in most sanctions regimes. In 1997 the UNSC decided that the measures did not apply to 
‘cases of medical emergency or to flights of aircraft carrying food, medicine, or supplies for essential 
humanitarian needs, as approved in advance by the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864’.79 
Further measures were threatened in 1997 against UNITA unless it complied with its obligation to 
follow the peace process.80 Such measures included an assets freeze on UNITA and its senior 
officials, and an obligation to prevent the import of conflict diamonds from Angola, as well as a 
prohibition on the supply of mining equipment and vehicles. These were imposed by the Security 
Council in 1998,81 thereby trying to prevent UNITA using funds from the export of diamonds or other 
minerals to finance its continuing rebellion. It was not until 2002, some nine years after the initial 
application of sanctions against UNITA, that the Security Council was able to welcome UNITA’s 
commitment to the full implementation of the ‘Accordos de Paz’. Both sanctions and the monitoring 
mechanism were terminated in that year.82    
                                                          
74 UN Doc S/RES/864 (1993) op para 17.  
75 On the international legal status of peace agreements between a government and NSAs see S. Sheeran, 
‘International Law, Peace Agreements and Self-Determination: The Case of Sudan’ (2011) 60 ICLQ 423 at 426-
31.  
76 UN Doc S/RES/864 (1993) op para 19. 
77 Ibid., op para 26. 
78 UN Doc S/RES/1127 (1997) op para 4. 
79 Ibid., op para 5. 
80 Ibid., op para 10. 
81 UN Doc S/RES/1173 (1998) op paras 11 and 12.  
82 UN Doc S/RES/1448 (2002). 
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The Security Council did not explicitly order states to place the obligations arising from these 
resolutions on Angola over any other conflicting treaty commitments they might have. Article 103 
was invoked in non-obligatory terms by the Security Council calling upon ‘all States, and all 
international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, 
notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international 
agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of adoption of 
this resolution’.83 Nonetheless, in order to fulfil their obligations under Charter arising from the 
resolutions, it is inevitable that states would have to give priority to those obligations when they 
conflicted with other existing international legal duties. In this vein the Security Council also called 
‘upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities violating the measures imposed by this 
resolution and to impose appropriate penalties’.84 Again the language was not one of obligation but it 
is difficult to see how states could ensure compliance with their obligations unless they criminalised 
or otherwise outlawed (by administrative or legislative measures) and punished such behaviour. 
 
In terms of monitoring and implementation, the 1993 resolution established a Committee of the 
Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council to undertake tasks of reviewing state 
reports on measures taken to comply with their obligations arising under the UN Charter by reason of 
binding decisions of the Security Council and, by gathering information on violations, to report on its 
work to the Council with its observations and recommendations.85 The measures against UNITA were 
best characterised as non-forcible collective measures taken by the Security Council in order to tackle 
a threat to international peace and security caused by UNITA’s on-going failure to comply with the 
peace accords by continuing to fight, and not as a punishment for UNITA’s violations of the accords 
or rules of international law, particularly international humanitarian law.    
 
 
6.2 Bosnian Serbs 
 
The division between measures imposed to confront threats to the peace and sanctions as punishment 
for breaches of international law appears to break down when considering those measures imposed 
against the Bosnian Serbs in the 1990s, the party to the conflict seen as acting most often in violation 
of international humanitarian law.86 While certain measures were taken on the basis that the violations 
of international law themselves constituted threats to the peace, particularly the creation of the 
ICTY,87 other non-forcible measures were imposed upon the Bosnian Serb leadership for refusing to 
settle peacefully and to continue fighting, and so were imposed and designed to tackle the threat to the 
peace caused by the Bosnian Serbs continued aggression. Furthermore, the non-forcible measures 
taken by the UN Security Council to tackle violations of international law (viz the establishment of 
the ICTY) were not targeted at the Bosnian Serbs leadership per se but at individual violators of 
international criminal law (including individuals from other NSAs as well as emerging states).  That 
aspect of the threat arising from the violence in Bosnia and consisting of violations of international 
law was addressed by the creation of an international criminal tribunal with powers of punishment, 
                                                          
83 UN Doc S/RES/864 (1993) op para 20. See also UN Doc S/RES/1127 (1997) op para 10. 
84 UN Doc S/RES/864 (1993) op para 21. 
85 UN Doc S/RES/864 (1993) op para 22. 
86 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 
UN Doc S/1994/674. 
87 The ICTY was created by UN Doc S/RES/827 (1993), which expressed its grave alarm at the widespread 
violations of IHL; determined that ‘this situation’ constitutes a threat to international peace and security; 
determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice those persons 
responsible for them; ‘convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the establishment 
as an ad hoc measure by the Council; of an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute 
to the restoration of peace and maintenance of peace’. In other words tackling violations of international law 
was itself one measure taken to address a threat to the peace – see Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY in the Tadic case Case No. IT-94-1-IT, 10 August 1995, para 19.     
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while the continuing conflict and refusal to settle peacefully were addressed by a variety of non-
forcible and forcible measures imposed by the Security Council.  
 
Article 41 empowers the Security Council to use a range of non-forcible measures to tackle threats, 
one type being ‘sanctions’ or coercive targeted measures aimed at limiting the capabilities of NSAs 
and thereby stopping, or at least limiting, the fighting; another being an international criminal tribunal 
whose creation was aimed at deterring the commission of egregious violations of international 
criminal law, the commission of which violated human security and thereby contributed to the overall 
threat. The Security Council has increasingly recognised that the protection of civilians is an 
important function in its overall responsibility under Article 24 of the Charter to maintain and restore 
peace and security.88  
 
In a decision adopted in 1994 (Resolution 942), the Security Council imposed measures after: 
 
Expressing appreciation for the efforts undertaken by the representatives of the United Nations, the 
European Union, the United States of America and the Russian Federation to assist the parties in 
reaching a settlement, 
Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all the Bosnian parties, and 
implemented in good faith by them, and condemning the decision by the Bosnian Serb party to refuse 
to accept the proposed territorial settlement (S/1994/1081), 
Viewing the measures imposed by the present resolution and by its previous relevant resolutions as a 
means towards the end of producing a negotiated settlement to the conflict.89 
 
To drive home the link between recalcitrance in the peace process with its determination of a threat to 
the peace, the Security Council: first expressed ‘its approval of the proposed territorial settlement for 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has been put to the Bosnian parties as part of an 
overall peace settlement’; secondly expressed ‘its satisfaction that the proposed territorial settlement 
has now been accepted in full by all except the Bosnian Serb party’; and finally, strongly condemned 
the ‘Bosnian Serb party for their refusal to accept the proposed territorial settlement, and demands 
that that party accept this settlement unconditionally and in full’.90 
 
The Resolution then obliged all states to undertake a range of measures to prevent ‘economic 
activities’ carried on within their territories by any entity, wherever incorporated or constituted, which 
was owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by individuals or entities within areas of Bosnia 
controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. ‘Economic activities’ were defined broadly to include ‘all activities 
of an economic nature, including commercial, financial and industrial activities and transactions, in 
particular all activities of an economic nature involving the use of or dealing in, with or in connection 
with property or interests in property’.91 It was clear that the embargo did not apply to supplies for 
medical purposes and foodstuffs, or products for essential humanitarian needs, notified to the 
Sanctions Committee established by the Security Council in 1991.92 In addition to a range of other 
non-forcible measures designed to cripple the economy of the Bosnian Serb areas, the 1994 resolution 
included an early version of the ‘listing’ process that has become emblematic of targeted sanctions in 
the modern era. The Security Council decided that states  were to prevent the entry into their 
territories of members of the Bosnian Serb authorities, Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary 
authorities, those persons supporting Bosnian Serb forces, and those violating the measures imposed 
by this and a previous resolution and, further, requested that the relevant Sanctions Committee 
‘establish and maintain an updated list, based on information provided by States and competent 
                                                          
88 UN Doc S/RES/1265 (1999). 
89 UN Doc S/RES/942 (1994). See also UN Doc S/RES/820 (1993). For US measures see Executive Order 
12934, October 25, 1994 – Blocking Property and Additional Measures with Respect to the Bosnian Serb-
Controlled Areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated to be not only adopted in the light of UNSC 
Resolution 942, but containing ‘additional steps’.   
90 UN Doc S/RES/942 (1994) op paras 1-3. 
91 Ibid., paras 7-9. 
92 UN Doc S/RES/724 (1991). 
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regional organizations, of the persons falling within this paragraph’.93 These measures were only 
terminated in 1996 following the Dayton Accords and the holding of peaceful elections in Bosnia.94 
 
 
7. Al-Qaida: The Break With Territorially Focused Measures   
 
One trend in UN Security Council targeted sanctions against NSAs, noted above, is a move towards 
widening the concept of ‘threat to the peace’, so that action taken to tackle the threat include measures 
directed at deterring or stopping the violence by NSAs, and measures aimed at those responsible for 
violations of human rights law and humanitarian law.  Although not present in the sanctions against 
UNITA, punitive non-forcible measures were included in the Security Council’s responses to the 
violence in Bosnia but in the form of the creation of an international criminal tribunal. This approach 
was developed in relation to Libya in 2011, when targeted sanctions were combined with a referral to 
the ICC. However, in more recent episodes, sanctions (in the form of assets freezes, travel bans etc.) 
have been imposed on NSAs either because they undermine the peace process or otherwise threaten 
the peace, but also if they threaten the human security of civilians, manifested in the commission of 
violations of international law. This is a reflection of a move towards not only securing peace within 
the state but also in establishing the security of individuals within it. Thus, although appearing to be a 
form of punishment for breaches of the law, they remain measures aimed at restoring peace and 
security but at the level of civilians as well as the state. As well as the examples mentioned above, 
whereby sanctions were taken on this basis against NSAs in the DR Congo, and the CAR, other 
examples can be found in Cote D’Ivoire,95 Lebanon,96 and Sudan.97  However, in other instances, 
targeted measures are more clearly of the UNITA-type, being directed at those regime elites and 
NSAs who have threatened the peace; for example in Guinea-Bissau,98  Iran,99 North Korea,100 
Liberia,101 Sierra Leone,102 Somalia,103 Eritrea,104 South Sudan,105 and Yemen.106 
 
The combination of state security and human security concerns is also found in UN Security Council 
targeted measures aimed at terrorist NSAs. Such measures have also shown an increasing global 
reach, by moving away from targeting NSAs found within specific states (although the measures 
themselves, such as the travel ban or assets freeze should be applied by all states), to targeting them 
wherever they are found, reflecting the global nature of certain terrorist networks. Initially, however, 
the anti-terrorist measures were more confined. Security Council sanctions against the Taliban and 
Al-Qaida originated in the late 1990s, with Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) being adopted 
specifically in response to the harbouring of Al-Qaida by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and 
more generally as measures against international terrorism essential for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Al-Qaida had already established its global terrorist credentials 
before September 2001 by its attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, mentioned 
in the preamble of Resolution 1267. The Resolution was directed at the Taliban for harbouring Al-
Qaida and for refusing to extradite them. If the Taliban did not comply with the Security Council’s 
demands to cease harbouring Al-Qaida, to take measures against them, and to hand Osama bin Laden 
                                                          
93 UN Doc S/RES/942 (1994) op para 14. 
94 UN Doc S/RES/1074 (1996). 
95 For example UN Doc S/RES/1572 (2004) op para 9. 
96 For example UN Doc S/RES/1636 (2005) op para 3. 
97 For example UN Doc S/RES/1591 (2005) op para 3(c).  
98 UN Doc S/RES/2048 (2012) op para 6. 
99 For example UN Doc S/RES/1737 (2006) op paras 10, 12. 
100 For example UN Doc S/RES/1718 (2006) op para 8(c). 
101 For example UN Doc S/RES/1343 (2001) op paras 2, 5-7. 
102 For example UN Doc S/RES/1132 (1997) op para 5. 
103 For example UN Doc S/RES/1844 (2008) op paras 1, 3. 
104 For example UN Doc S/RES/1907 (2009) para 14. 
105 UN Doc S/RES/2206 (2015) op para 6. 
106 For example UN Doc S/RES/2140 (2014). 
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over to countries where he had been indicted, the Security Council required all states to freeze funds 
owned and directly controlled by the Taliban, specifically to: 
 
Freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or generated from property owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the 
Taliban, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, and ensure that neither they 
nor any other funds or financial resources so designated are made available, by their nationals or by 
any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban or any undertaking owned or 
controlled, directly or indirectly by the Taliban, except as may be authorized by the Committee on a 
case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need.107 
 
The Security Council called upon ‘all states to act strictly in accordance with the provision of this 
resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any 
international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the dates 
of coming into force of the measures’. Again the reference to the supremacy of UN obligations seems 
to be softened by the non-mandatory language whereby states are ‘called upon’ to act in accordance 
with those obligations notwithstanding any inconsistent obligations; nonetheless those obligations, 
including ones of prioritization, exist for states following a decision to impose measures under 
Chapter VII, by virtue of Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter. Its choice of language indicates that 
the Security Council recognises that the obligations to comply and to give priority to its decisions 
come from the Charter not from the organ directly.108 The measures would cease to apply as soon as 
the Taliban complied with its obligations under the resolution.109 
 
UNSC Resolution 1333 (2000) extended these measures beyond members of the de facto government 
of Afghanistan to clear NSAs, namely Osama bin Laden and ‘individuals and entities associated with 
him as designated by the Committee’, including those in Al Qaida. As well as an assets freeze, and 
being denied access to finances and arms, members of Al Qaida and its supporters were, if listed, also 
subject to travel bans. The relevant paragraph required states: 
 
To freeze without delay funds and other financial assets of Usama bin Laden and individuals and 
entities associated with him as designated by the Committee, including those in the Al-Qaida 
organization, and including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by Usama bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with him, and to ensure that 
neither they nor any other funds or financial resources are made available, by their nationals or by any 
persons within their territory, directly or indirectly for the benefit of Usama bin Laden, his associates or 
any entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by Usama bin Laden or individuals and entities 
associated with him including the Al-Qaida organization and requests the Committee to maintain an 
updated list, based on information provided by States and regional organizations, of the individuals and 
entities designated as being associated with Usama bin Laden, including those in the Al-Qaida 
organization.110 
                                                          
107 UN Doc S/RES/1267 (1999) op para 4(b). Under op para 6 the 1267 Committee was established also to 
receive and consider information supplied by states on compliance and violations, and to designate individuals 
to be subject to the measures taken under op para 4. 
108 D.W. Bowett, ‘Judicial and Political Functions of the Security Council and the International Court of Justice’ 
in H. Fox (ed), The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law 1997) 79-80. 
109 UN Doc S/RES/1267 (1999) op paras 4, 7, 14. 
110 UN Doc S/RES/1333 (2000) op para 8(c). On EU measures see Council Common Position 2002/402/CFSP 
concerning restrictive measures against Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organisation and the 
Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and repealing Common 
Positions 96/746/CFSP, 1999/727/CFSP, 2001/154/CFSP and 2001/771/CFSP OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 4. 
Amended by Common Position 2003/140/CFSP (OJ L 53, 28.2.2003, p. 62) (exceptions) and Council Decision 
2011/487/CFSP (OJ L 199, 2.8.2011, p. 73) (amendment of title and scope). Most recently amended by 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/167 of 3 February 2015 amending for the 225th time Council 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and 
entities associated with the Al Qaida network OJ L 28, 4.2.2015, p. 40–41 (to update the Al-Qaida terrorist 
blacklist to bring it in line with recent revisions by the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee). 
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Resolutions 1989 and 1988 of 2011 finally separated the measures against the Taliban from those 
against Al-Qaida, thereby completely severing the nexus between Afghanistan and Al-Qaida, with the 
sanctions first imposed in Resolution 1267 being applied by the 1267 Committee to Al-Qaida,111 
while Resolution 1988 created a new committee to administer those targeted measures directed at the 
Taliban.112 The targeted measures against the Taliban became more specifically directed at bringing 
them to the negotiating table.113  
 
It is interesting to note that review by the ombudsperson established by UNSC Resolution 1904 in 
2009 only applies to those on the Al-Qaida Sanctions List as administered by the 1267 Committee and 
not to any lists beyond that, including the Taliban list. This seemingly curious anomaly is probably 
explained by the overarching pragmatism of the Security Council on the matter of accountability for 
wrongly listing individuals; that complaints to international, regional and judicial bodies have derived 
largely from the 1267 list and the office of the ombudsperson is a response to that.114 The lack of 
remedies elsewhere in the UN system, for wrongly listed individuals, puts the creation of the 
ombudsperson in perspective, but it also fits the prevalent view in the Security Council that such 
measures are administrative ones taken in response to an international threat caused by the activities 
of international terrorist organisations and, therefore, any remedial measures should only be of a 
controlled administrative nature. However, as argued above, long-term listing constitutes a form of 
punishment that raises issues of legal remedies based on violations of due process norms found 
located in the international human rights obligations of states.   
 
 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Sanctions against NSAs are now commonplace and they follow a distinct pattern in types of 
measures, whether imposed by the UN, EU or US. They are taken in response to threats to peace and 
security, although once one moves away from UN measures, the purposes and values protected may 
become broader and but are potentially not necessarily in the collective interest. Quite often 
international, regional and national measures are targeted at the same NSAs but there may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Council Regulation 881/2002/EC imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons 
and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening 
the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of 
Afghanistan OJ L 139/9, 29.5.2002 p. 9. On US measures see, for example, Executive Order 13224—Blocking 
Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 
66 FR 49079, September 24, 2001. 
111 UN Doc S/RES/1989 (2011); reaffirms the assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo affecting all 
individuals and entities on the 1267 Committee’s Al-Qaida Sanctions List. Decides to split the Consolidated 
List, after ‘noting with concern the continued threat posed to international peace and security by Al-Qaida and 
other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with it’.  
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differences in content and scope. Furthermore, consensus on taking such measures is harder to attain 
at the UN level than at the regional and, even more so, the national level, leading to autonomous 
regional and national measures, and raising questions about their compatibility with international laws 
governing non-forcible measures. The doctrine of counter-measures, which after all is confined to-
state-to state responses but, moreover, is concerned with responses to violations of international laws 
not with threats to peace and security, is inadequate as a legal basis for many non-forcible measures 
taken at the sub-UN level. While there is room for collective measures taken to uphold international 
norms of public order at the regional level as well as the UN level, there are doubts about States 
unilaterally imposing such measures, even though they may be presented as responses to threats to 
that particular state. However, unlike some instances of unilateral sanctions imposed against States 
such as Cuba that do incur international censure,115 other unilateral sanctions taken against NSAs 
seem to be endured if not explicitly accepted as lawful. 
 
Aspects of the sanctions regimes against NSAs are grounded in the existing state-based international 
legal order, by being a natural extension of sanctions regimes of the past imposed against states as a 
whole (for example Iraq and Serbia). Such sanctions regimes target those in power, regime elites, de 
facto authorities or rebels holding territory. The nexus to state-like authority and territory is clear. 
However, sanctions against NSA terrorist organizations or networks with genuine global reach are 
more challenging. Although they are clearly premised on protecting international public order norms 
and values, their scope and reach is potentially greater as the UN, regional organizations, and 
powerful states attempt to extend their application and effectiveness to tackle NSAs whose raison 
d’etre is to challenge the existing international legal order. International legal structures and processes 
are emerging to achieve these aims but it will be a number of years before the developments that 
started with sanctions against UNITA and the Bosnian Serbs not only address the threat represented 
by groups such as Al-Qaida, and the self-proclaimed Islamic State that operates across the Middle 
East,116 but also do so in a way that is coordinated and fully in accordance with international law. 
Indeed, there needs to be greater precision and clarity on the legal parameters and specific norms 
under which non-forcible measures, sanctions and countermeasures in the collective interest can be 
taken.  
 
While it is easy to accuse powerful States of disregarding international norms, the fact is that there is a 
lack of progressive thinking on how to achieve a system of sanctions against NSAs that empowers but 
also limits sanctioning in ways that protects internationally agreed norms and values. A first step 
would be to clarify the nature and content of international public order norms aimed at promoting 
peace and achieving security (both the security of states and that of civilians – i.e. state security and 
human security) and, by so doing, place non-forcible measures more squarely in the international 
legal order than at present where their invocation is a matter of politics, although their effects are 
increasingly being judged in legal bodies at national, regional and international levels. What is clear is 
that to be both effective and lawful there needs to be a greater assimilation of international, regional 
and national responses to terrorists networks and other NSAs that represent threats not only to 
innocent individuals but to the existing international order.     
                                                          
115 See for example UN Doc A/RES/67/4 (2012); EU, ‘Demarches Protesting the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity Act’ (1996) 35 ILM 397. 
116 In 2014 the UN Security Council started imposing targeted sanctions against Islamic State – see UN Docs 
S/RES/2170 (2014); S/RES/2178 (2014); S/RES/2199 (2015).  
